Financial Markets and Dissent in the ECBâ€™s Governing Council
Peter Tillmann ()
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Peter Tillmann: Justus-Liebig-University Giessen
MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)
The decision-making process in the ECBâ€™s Governing Council remains opaque as the ECB, in contrast to many other central banks, does not publish the votes for or against a policy proposal. In this paper, we construct an index of dissent based on the ECB presidentsâ€™ answers to journalistsâ€™ questions during the press conference following each meeting. This narrative account of dissent suggests that dissenting votes are cast frequently. We show that the non-forecastable component of dissent weakens the response of long-term interest rates to policy surprises and thus affects the monetary transmission mechanism. The yield response is significantly stronger under unanimity compared to dissent. This finding is robust to several alternative specifications.
Keywords: event studies; monetary policy transmission; monetary policy committee; disagreement; term structure (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E42 E43 E58 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 55 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cba, nep-eec, nep-mac and nep-mon
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mar:magkse:202048
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