The Influence of Politiciansâ€™ Sex on Political Budget Cycles: An Empirical Analysis of Spanish Municipalities
Israel Garcia () and
Bernd Hayo ()
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Israel Garcia: University of Marburg
MAGKS Papers on Economics from Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung)
Does a politicianâ€™s sex influence political budget cycles (PBCs)? We answer this question using a sample of Spanish municipalities from the Madrid region for the period 2010âˆ’2019. The Madrid region has a homogenous set of budget rules that allows consistently categorising budget expenditure items as either â€˜mandatoryâ€™ or â€˜non-mandatoryâ€™ public services. After differentiating between small and large municipalities, gender influence is studied along two dimensions: mayorâ€™s sex and share of women in government. Our findings include, in regard to non-mandatory spending in large municipalities, that gender-balanced governments prevent PBCs. In small municipalities, when the share of women in government is above 60%, pre-electoral spending is actually reduced by up to 3.5% of an average municipal budget. Moreover, female mayors reduce pre-electoral spending. In large municipalities, female mayors tend to engage in opportunistic manipulation, increasing pre-electoral spending, regardless of the share of women in government.
Keywords: Gender; Political budget cycles; Signalling mechanism; Local politicians; Fiscal policy; Spanish municipalities; Madrid region (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D72 E62 H72 J16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 44 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mar:magkse:202223
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