Network Competition and Team Chemistry in the NBA
William Horrace (),
Hyunseok Jung () and
Shane Sanders ()
Additional contact information
Hyunseok Jung: Department of Economics, University of Arkansas, https://walton.uark.edu/departments/economics/directory.php?id=hj020
Shane Sanders: Department of Sports Management, Syracuse University, https://falk.syr.edu/people/sandersshane/
No 226, Center for Policy Research Working Papers from Center for Policy Research, Maxwell School, Syracuse University
We consider a heterogeneous social interaction model where agents interact with peers within their own network but also interact with agents across other (non-peer) networks. To address potential endogeneity in the networks, we assume that each network has a central planner who makes strategic network decisions based on observable and unobservable characteristics of the peers in her charge. The model forms a simultaneous equation system that can be estimated by Quasi-Maximum Likelihood. We apply a restricted version of our model to data on National Basketball Association games, where agents are players, networks are individual teams organized by coaches, and competition is head-to-head. That is, at any time a player only interacts with two networks: their team and the opposing team. We find significant positive within-team peer-effects and both negative and positive opposing-team competitor-effects in NBA games. The former are interpretable as “team chemistries" which enhance the individual performances of players on the same team. The latter are interpretable as “team rivalries," which can either enhance or diminish the individual performance of opposing players.
Keywords: Spatial Analysis; Peer Effects; Endogeneity; Machine Learning (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C13 C31 D24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 57 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-big, nep-cmp, nep-com, nep-gth, nep-net, nep-ore, nep-spo and nep-ure
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:max:cprwps:226
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