Designing the Financial Tools to Promote Universal Access to AIDS Care
Patrick Leoni () and
Stephane Luchini
Economics Department Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth
Abstract:
We argue that reluctance to invest in drug treatments to fight the AIDS epidemics in developing countries is largely motivated by severe losses occurring from the future albeit uncertain appearance of a curative vaccine. We design a set of securities generating full insurance coverage against such losses, while achieving full risk-sharing with vaccine development agencies. In a general equilibrium framework, we show that those securities are demanded to improve social welfare in developing countries, to increase current investment in treatments and the provision of public goods. Even though designed foi AIDS, those securities can also be applied to other epidemics such as Malaria and Tuberculosis.
Keywords: HIV/Aids funding; security design; therapeutic innovation; health underinvestment; HIV/Aids vaccine (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G15 I1 I3 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2006
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http://repec.maynoothuniversity.ie/mayecw-files/N1711106.pdf (application/pdf)
Related works:
Journal Article: Designing the financial tools to promote universal access to AIDS care (2011) 
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:may:mayecw:n1711106
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