Politician Preferences,Law-Abiding Lobbyists and Caps on Political Lobbying

Ivan Pastine and Tuvana Pastine ()
Additional contact information
Tuvana Pastine: Economics Finance and Accounting, National University of Ireland, Maynooth

Economics Department Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth

Abstract: The effect of a contribution cap is analyzed in a political lobbying game where the politician has a preference for the policy position of one of the lobbyists. In contrast to the previous literature where the politician has no preference over policy alternatives, we find that a more restrictive binding cap always reduces expected aggregate contributions. However, the politician might support a barely binding cap over no cap on contributions. The cap always favors the lobbyist whose policy position is preferred irrespective of the identity of the high-valuation lobbyist. The introduction of politician policy preferences permits an analysis of welfare tradeoffs of contribution caps. Even a barely binding cap can have significant welfare consequences.

Keywords: All-pay auction; campaign finance reform; explicit ceiling. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2008
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.maynoothuniversity.ie/mayecw-files/N1991208.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:may:mayecw:n1991208.pdf

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Department Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).