Asymmetric Doping Effects and Sanctions in Sporting Contests

Paul O’Sullivan ()
Additional contact information
Paul O’Sullivan: Economics, National University of Ireland, Maynooth

Economics Department Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth

Abstract: This paper analyses a one-shot game where, prior to a contest, two athletes simultaneously decide whether to engage in doping that is not certain to be detected. Doping is assumed to have at least as great a proportional effect on a naturally weaker athlete’s win probability. Given an explicit contest success function, the paper derives an optimal sanction scheme, where sanctions are identically proportional to prizes, sufficient to always induce a no-doping equilibrium. In comparison to previous papers, the winner’s optimal sanction, expressed in terms of talent and doping levels and doping costs, may be lower for all detection probabilities.

JEL-codes: C72 D78 K42 Z28 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2015
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-law
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.maynoothuniversity.ie/mayecw-files/N262-15.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:may:mayecw:n262-15.pdf

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Economics Department Working Paper Series from Department of Economics, National University of Ireland - Maynooth Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ( this e-mail address is bad, please contact ).