HOW CORRUPTION HITS PEOPLE WHEN THEY ARE DOWN

Jennifer Hunt

Departmental Working Papers from McGill University, Department of Economics

Abstract: Using cross--country and Peruvian data, I show that victims of misfortune, particularly crime victims, are much more likely than non--victims to bribe public officials. Misfortune increases victims' demand for public services, raising bribery indirectly, and also increases victims' propensity to bribe certain officials conditional on using them, possibly because victims are desperate, vulnerable, or demanding services particularly prone to corruption. The effect is strongest for bribery of the police, where the increase in bribery comes principally through increased use of the police. For the judiciary the effect is also strong, and for some misfortunes is composed equally of an increase in use and an increase in bribery conditional on use. The expense and disutility of bribing thus compound the misery brought by misfortune.

JEL-codes: K4 O12 O17 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 39 pages
Date: 2006-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-his and nep-mac
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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Related works:
Journal Article: How corruption hits people when they are down (2007)
Working Paper: How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down (2006)
Working Paper: How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down (2006)
Working Paper: How Corruption Hits People When They Are Down (2006)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcl:mclwop:2006-07

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