Credibility Dynamics and Inflation Expectations
Rumen Kostadinov and
Francisco Roldán ()
Department of Economics Working Papers from McMaster University
We study the optimal design of a disinflation plan by a planner who lacks commitment and has imperfect control over inflation. The government’s reputation for being committed to the plan evolves as the public compares realized inflation to the announced targets. Reputation is valuable as it helps curb inflation expectations. At the same time, plans that are more tempting to break lead to larger expected reputational losses in the ensuing equilibrium. Taking these dynamics into consideration, the government announces a plan which balances promises of low inflation with dynamic incentives that make them credible. We find that, despite the absence of inflation inertia in the private economy, a gradual disinflation is preferred even in the zero-reputation limit.
Keywords: Imperfect credibility; reputation; optimal monetary policy; time inconsistency (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C73 E52 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mac and nep-mon
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Working Paper: Credibility dynamics and inflation expectations (2021)
Working Paper: Credibility Dynamics and Disinflation Plans (2020)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2021-06
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in Department of Economics Working Papers from McMaster University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().