Robust Equilibria in General Competing Mechanism Games
Department of Economics Working Papers from McMaster University
This paper proposes a general competing mechanism game of incomplete information where a mechanism allows its designer to send a message to himself at the same time agents send messages. This paper introduces a notion of robust equilibrium. If each agent’s payoff function is separable with respect to principals’ actions, they lead to the full characterization of equilibrium allocations in terms of incentive compatible direct mechanisms without reference to the set of arbitrary mechanisms allowed in the game. Szentes’ Critique (Szentes (2010)) on the standard competing mechanism game of complete information is also valid in a model with incomplete information.
Keywords: competing mechanisms; robust equations; general mechanisms; direct mechanisms (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 D86 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta, nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2021-07
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