A Unified Approach to Equilibrium Analysis in Competing Mechanism Games
Seungjin Han () and
Department of Economics Working Papers from McMaster University
This paper provides a unified approach to equilibrium analysis in models for competing mechanisms (e.g., Szentes (2009), Yamashita (2010)), which may differ in terms of delegation of action choice, announcement of mechanisms, observability of messages, and equilibrium notions.
Keywords: competing mechanisms; unified equilibrium analysis; multiple principals (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 47 pages
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-des, nep-gth and nep-mic
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2021-09
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