Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment

Seungjin Han and Siyang Xiong

Department of Economics Working Papers from McMaster University

Abstract: Inspired by Szentes' critique (Szentes (2009)), we study common agency models with non-delegated contracts. In such a setup, we prove that the menu theorem in Peters (2001) holds partially only under some particular information structure, and we use examples to show that it fails generally. Furthermore, we prove a menu-of-menu-with-recommendation theorem in our models. Finally, we show that our results can beeasily extended to common agency with imperfect commitment a la Bester and Strausz (2000, 2001, 2007).

Keywords: common agency; non-delegation; imperfect commitment; menu theorem; menu of menus with recommendation (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C79 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 2022-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-dem and nep-mic
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Working Paper: Common Agency with Non-Delegation or Imperfect Commitment (2023)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:deptwp:2022-05

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