Communtication in a Common Pool Resource Environment with Probabilistic Destruction
Andrew Muller and
McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications from McMaster University
We replicate and extend an experiment due to Walker and Gardner by investigating the effect of communication in a common pool resource subject to probabilistic destruction when group appropriation exceeds a safe zone. We replicate the Gardner and Walker result that destruction of the resource is rapid and efficiencies are low when communication is not allowed. Face-to-face communication significantly increases mean efficiency. Three groups of five sustain a “good” Nash equilibrium in the safe zone. The remaining two groups quickly destroy the resource. Achieving a “good” equilibrium is highly dependent on the emergence of a leader in the group communication.
JEL-codes: Q22 C92 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:mceelp:1996-01
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