Communtication in a Common Pool Resource Environment with Probabilistic Destruction

Andrew Muller and Michelle Vickers

McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications from McMaster University

Abstract: We replicate and extend an experiment due to Walker and Gardner by investigating the effect of communication in a common pool resource subject to probabilistic destruction when group appropriation exceeds a safe zone. We replicate the Gardner and Walker result that destruction of the resource is rapid and efficiencies are low when communication is not allowed. Face-to-face communication significantly increases mean efficiency. Three groups of five sustain a “good” Nash equilibrium in the safe zone. The remaining two groups quickly destroy the resource. Achieving a “good” equilibrium is highly dependent on the emergence of a leader in the group communication.

JEL-codes: C92 Q22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 1996-01
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (12)

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Related works:
Working Paper: Communication in a Common Pool Resource Environment with Probabilistic Destruction (1996)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:mceelp:1996-01

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