Exogenous Targeting Instruments with Heterogeneous Agents
John Spraggon ()
McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications from McMaster University
This paper investigates the ability of ambient pollution instruments to induce a group of heterogeneous agents to choose a target outcome. Six controlled laboratory sessions were conducted with heterogeneous agents facing ambient pollution instruments with lump sum or proportional fines and bonuses. Sessions are compared with a study of these exogenous targeting instruments and homogenous agents using complete information and certainty . The data show that contracts can indeed be developed that induce heterogeneous groups to choose the target outcome; however, substantial inefficiency and inequality were observed.
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2) Track citations by RSS feed
Downloads: (external link)
Our link check indicates that this URL is bad, the error code is: 403 Forbidden (http://socserv.socsci.mcmaster.ca/econ/mceel/papers/Hetag030501.pdf [301 Moved Permanently]--> https://socialsciences.mcmaster.ca/econ/mceel/papers/Hetag030501.pdf)
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.
Export reference: BibTeX
RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan)
Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mcm:mceelp:2003-02
Access Statistics for this paper
More papers in McMaster Experimental Economics Laboratory Publications from McMaster University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by ().