Information and Pollution Permit Markets

David Colander

Middlebury College Working Paper Series from Middlebury College, Department of Economics

Abstract: In a recent article Smith and Yates (Smith and Yates, 2003) argued that regulators could gain additional information about the optimal number of permits to issue from two-sided markets. This paper argues that they are incorrect in their assertion because the market they refer to is an asymmetric two-sided market in which individuals are only allowed to decrease the number of permits. When a corrct two-sided market is considered, the public good nature of the problem makes it unlikely that any useful information can come from a two-sided market.

Pages: 5 pages
Date: 2003-08
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-com, nep-ene and nep-res
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http://www.middlebury.edu/services/econ/repec/mdl/ancoec/0321.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Information and Pollution Permit Markets (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mdl:mdlpap:0321

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