Dynamics in ownership and firm survival: Evidence from corporate Germany

Jens Köke
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Jens Köke: Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA), Postal: Amalienstr. 33, D-80799 Munich

No 2013, MEA discussion paper series from Munich Center for the Economics of Aging (MEA) at the Max Planck Institute for Social Law and Social Policy

Abstract: This study investigates the determinants of changes in corporate ownership and firm failure, taking into account different types of sellers and buyers of control blocks. For a large panel of German corporations we find that firms are more likely to fail or to be sold when performance is poor, financial pressure is high, and firm size is small. Cross-ownership deters control changes, and ownership concentration has a non-linear impact on the likelihood of control transfer. In contrast to corporate shareholders, private shareholders tend to sell control blocks when financial pressure increases.

JEL-codes: G32 G33 G34 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-01-24
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