Short & long run transmission incentives for generation location

Ralph Turvey

Working Papers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology, Center for Energy and Environmental Policy Research

Abstract: This paper is about one aspect of Britain’s electricity trading system, its advantages and its weaknesses concerning the incentives it provides or fails to provide for the location of generation. (Similar considerations apply to the location of loads, though these are less responsive to locational influences exerted by the trading system).

Date: 2006-03
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