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The Tort Law and the Nucleolus for Generalized Joint Liability Problems

Takayuki Oishi (), Gerard van der Laan and René van den Brink
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Takayuki Oishi: Meisei University
Gerard van der Laan: VU University Amsterdam
René van den Brink: VU University Amsterdam

No 37, Discussion Papers from Meisei University, School of Economics

Abstract: We analyze a legal compensation scheme axiomatically under the situation where causation of the cumulative injury appears in multiple sequences of wrongful acts caused by tortfeasors. This situation is a generalization of joint liability problems on tort law, and it is described by a rooted-tree graph. We show that there is a unique compensation scheme that satisfies three axioms, one about lower bounds of individual compensations, one about upper bounds of individual compensations, and one about case-system consistency. These axioms are derived from legal observations on tort law. The unique compensation scheme satisfying the three axioms yields the Nucleolus of an associated liability game.

Keywords: Tort law; Rooted-tree graph; Axiomatization; Nucleolus (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D63 K13 K49 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-law
Date: 2018-03
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