What is the contribution of the theory of redistribution systems to the theory of corruption?

Milan Palat (), Petr Wawrosz and Tomáš Otáhal ()
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Milan Palat: Department of Territorial Studies, Faculty of Regional Development and International Studies, Mendel University in Brno

No 2012-25, MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics from Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics

Abstract: Scholars making economic policy recommendations to resolve corruption problem use several approaches, the most dominant of which are the principal-agent and rent-seeking theories. In this paper, we argue that the principal-agent theory has problems accounting for the environment in which the agents offering and accepting corruption operate, as well as explaining the importance of the agents for the survival of their environment. The rent-seeking theory, on the other hand, finds it difficult to establish socially effective legislation and ways to determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly. Both problems, however, are vital for solving the problem of corruption. Lacking the knowledge of the agent's environment (system) and their significance for the survival of the system, the theory cannot define incentives that would discourage the agent from acting in a corrupted way. If the rent-seeking theory does not determine the barriers to entry that motivate agents to behave corruptly, it cannot determine the proper legislation that would deter corrupt behavior and lead to economic development. For these reasons we investigate if both problems can be explained and solved within the alternative theory of redistribution systems and its part - the theory of parallel redistribution games.

Keywords: Corruption; redistribution system; parallel redistribution game; game theory (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 D72 D74 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 19
Date: 2012-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-hpe
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