Mises, Hayek and Corruption

Tomáš Otáhal ()

No 2013-34, MENDELU Working Papers in Business and Economics from Mendel University in Brno, Faculty of Business and Economics

Abstract: Using the arguments of Ludwig von Mises and Friedrich August von Hayek, I argue that private ownership solves the economic problem of corruption. Since private ownership discourages entrepreneurs from rent-seeking, and privately owned media provide objective and unbiased information to citizens, any legal reform establishing and enforcement of private ownership also solves the corruption problem.

Keywords: Austrian school; corruption; economic calculation; rent-seeking (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B25 D73 D83 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 15
Date: 2013-03
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Journal Article: Mises, Hayek and Corruption (2014)
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