The Scope of Auctions in the Presence of Downstream Interactions and Information Externalities
Onur Koska (),
Ilke Onur () and
Frank Stähler ()
No 1611, ERC Working Papers from ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University
TWe scrutinize the scope of auctions for firm acquisitions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities. We Show that no mechanism exists that allows an investor to acquire a low-cost firm under incomplete information: a separating auction implies adverse selection and relies substantially on commitment to allocation and transfer rules. A pooling auction serves as a commitment device against ex-post opportunistic behavior and alleviates adverse selection. It can earn the investor a higher expected payoff than a separating auction, even when consistency is required as to qualify for a sequential equilibrium.
Keywords: Takeover; Auction; Externality; IncompleteInformation; Commitment (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 34 pages
Date: 2016-09, Revised 2016-09
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-mic
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http://erc.metu.edu.tr/en/system/files/menu/series16/1611.pdf First version, 2016 (application/pdf)
Journal Article: The scope of auctions in the presence of downstream interactions and information externalities (2018)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:met:wpaper:1611
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