EconPapers    
Economics at your fingertips  
 

BARGAINING IN LEGISLATURES OVER PRIVATE AND PUBLIC GOODS WITH ENDOGENOUS RECOGNITION

Hakan Genç () and Serkan Küçükşenel ()
Additional contact information
Hakan Genç: Department of Economics, Middle East Technical University, Ankara, Turkey

No 1805, ERC Working Papers from ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University

Abstract: This paper studies a sequential model of multilateral bargaining with a majority rule in which legislators can make decisions over both private and public good dimensions with endogenous recognition process. Legislators expend resources to be the proposer and make proposals about the allocation of private and public goods. We show that legislators can exert effort to be the proposer and make proposals in both dimensions depending on legislative preferences. Effort choices in equilibrium mainly depend on preferences over both distributional and ideological dimensions, as well as the patience level of legislators and the size of the legislature. We also show that in a diverse legislature, it may be possible to have distributive policies when the majority has collective desires or vice-versa.

Keywords: Multilateral bargaining; majority rule; public goods (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C71 C78 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 29 pages
Date: 2018-03, Revised 2018-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: Track citations by RSS feed

Downloads: (external link)
http://erc.metu.edu.tr/en/system/files/menu/series18/1805.pdf First version, 2018 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Bargaining in legislatures over private and public goods with endogenous recognition (2019) Downloads
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:met:wpaper:1805

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in ERC Working Papers from ERC - Economic Research Center, Middle East Technical University Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Erol Taymaz ().

 
Page updated 2023-02-03
Handle: RePEc:met:wpaper:1805