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The Fault Lines at City Hall: Reflections on Toronto’s local government

André Côté
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André Côté: Ontario Ministry of Advanced Education and Skills Development

No 1, IMFG Perspectives from University of Toronto, Institute on Municipal Finance and Governance

Abstract: Drawing on academic literature, media reporting, and some illustrative events, this paper takes a careful look at local government in Toronto and examines three of the major fault lines that are causing friction at City Hall. The first fault line is political leadership, focusing on who is providing it and how it is effectively exercised in a system in which Council is supreme and the mayor has fewer formal powers of agenda control, persuasion, and patronage than his parliamentary counterparts. The second fault line is accountability, which the paper explores through two lenses: formalized institutional accountability mechanisms in law and policies, and the informal way in which citizens hold elected officials politically accountable for commitments, choices, or the general condition of the city. The third fault line is the role of the Toronto Public Service, amid concerns that political pressure, the public dismissal of senior officials, and other forces are “politicizing” staff.

Keywords: local government; political leadership; Toronto (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 13 pages
Date: 2013-01
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https://tspace.library.utoronto.ca/bitstream/1807/ ... _lines_cote_2013.pdf First version, 2013 (application/pdf)

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