Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations

Christopher Cotton

No 902, Working Papers from University of Miami, Department of Economics

Abstract: A bidder may increase his bid over the course of an auction when (1) he becomes more certain about his private valuation over time (as he has more time to consider using the item), and (2) there is a positive probability he is unable to return to the auction to submit a bid in a later period. Evidence from a classroom experiment supports the theoretical findings.

Keywords: auction; eBay; multiple bidding; value discovery (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D44 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2008-05
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta and nep-exp
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Forthcoming: Under Review

Downloads: (external link)
https://www.herbert.miami.edu/_assets/files/repec/wp2009-02-multiplebidding.pdf First version, 2008 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Journal Article: Multiple bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations (2009)
Working Paper: Multiple-bidding in auctions as bidders become confident of their private valuations (2007)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mia:wpaper:0902

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