On the expect of ideology in proportional representation systems

Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

No 160, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we propose a model in which there are ideological and strategic voters who vote under poportional rule. We prove that the behavior of ideological voters matters, in that it a¤ects the outcome. We also show how a subset of strategic voters changes his voting be- havior to balance the ideological players? votes. However, they can only partially adjust. Strategic voters will vote accordingly to this cutpoint outcome: any strategic voter on its right votes for the right- most party and any strategic voter on its left votes for the leftmost party.

Keywords: Proportional Election; Strategic Voting; Ideological Voting. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 16 pages
Date: 2009-04, Revised 2009-04
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:160

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