Oligopolistic Screening and Two-way distortion

Federico Etro () and Michela Cella ()

No 200, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: We analyze the choice of incentive contracts by olipolistic ?rms that compete on the product market. Managers have private information and in the ?rst stage they exert cost reducing e¤ort. In equilibrium the standard ?no distortion at the top? property disappears and two way distortions are optimal. We extend our analysis to other informational, contractual and competitive settings.

Keywords: oligopoly; screening; two way distortion; incentives; investments (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D21 D82 D86 L13 L22 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28 pages
Date: 2010-11, Revised 2010-11
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper200.pdf First version, 2010 (application/pdf)

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Working Paper: Oligopolistic Screening and Two-way Distortion (2010)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:200

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