On the superiority of approval vs plurality: a counterexample

Francesco De Sinopoli and Giovanna Iannantuoni ()

No 210, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: We present a simple voting environment where the Condorcet winner exists. Under plurality rule, the derived game has a stable set where such a candidate is elected with probability one. However, no stable set of the approval game elects the Condorcet winner with positive probability.

Keywords: Approval voting; Plurality voting; Sophisticated voting; Mertens Stability. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 7 pages
Date: 2011-06, Revised 2011-06
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
References: Add references at CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (4)

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper210.pdf First version, 2011 (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:210

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matteo Pelagatti ().