Voting for Legislators

Francesco De Sinopoli, Giovanna Iannantuoni () and Elena Manzoni

No 240, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we propose a model with uncertainty in which strategic voters vote, under poportional rule, for a Parliament and parties bargain to form a government. We prove that only consensus government form and only extreme parties take votes.

Keywords: Proportional Election; Strategic Voting; Legislative Bargaining (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 9
Date: 2013-03, Revised 2013-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-gth, nep-mic and nep-pol
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:240

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