Boundedly Rational Opinion Dynamics in Directed Social Networks: Theory and Experimental Evidence

Pietro Battiston and Luca Stanca

No 267, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper investigates opinion dynamics and social influence in directed communication networks. We study the properties of a generalized boundedly rational model of opinion formation in which individuals aggregate the information they receive by using weights that are a function of their neighbors' indegree. We then present an experiment designed to test the predictions of the model. We find that both Bayesian updating and boundedly rational updating à la DeMarzo et al. (2003) are rejected by the data. Consistent with our theoretical predictions, the social influence of an agent is positively and significantly affected by the number of individuals she listens to. When forming their opinions, agents do take into account the structure of the communication network, although in a sub-optimal way.

Keywords: Social Networks; Learning; Social In uence; Bounded Rationality (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: A14 D83 D85 L14 Z13 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 42
Date: 2014-01, Revised 2014-01
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cbe, nep-cdm, nep-exp, nep-net, nep-soc and nep-ure
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper267.pdf First version, 2014 (application/pdf)

Related works:
Working Paper: Boundedly Rational Opinion Dynamics in Social Networks: Does Indegree Matter? (2015)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:267

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