Constitutional Rules and Efficient Policies

Michela Cella, Giovanna Iannantuoni () and Elena Manzoni

No 270, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper compares the ability to select the efficient policy of a parliamentary and a presidential constitutional setup. In order to do it we build a dynamic theoretical model with asymmetric information that succeeds in addressing both the politicians accountability and the competence dimensions. The main difference between the two institutional frameworks is the presence of the confidence vote in the parliamentary system that may cause elections before the natural end of the legislature. The equilibrium predictions suggest that, exactly because of the different incentives created by the confidence vote, the parliamentary system has a higher probability of selecting the efficient policy the higher is the quality of politicians that are member of the legislative body.

Keywords: presidential system; parliamentary system; comparison con dence vote; hierarchical accountability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D72 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 45
Date: 2014-03, Revised 2014-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm and nep-pol
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (1)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:270

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