Reconsidering The Pros and Cons of Fiscal Policy Coordination in a Monetary Union: Should We Set Public Expenditure Targets?

Marco Catenaro and Patrizio Tirelli
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Marco Catenaro: University of Milan-Bicocca and University of Surrey (UniS)

No 30, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: We reconsider the issues of fiscal policy interdependence in a monetary union, challenging the view that non co-ordination is always preferable. Moreover, we show that an expenditure bias occurs irrespective of the fiscal regime in place. We argue that a contractualist approach à la Walsh should be extended to the conduct of fiscal policy, setting explicit public expenditure targets.

Keywords: EMU; Fiscal Leadership; ECB; Fiscal Co-ordination; Inflation Targets (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E52 E58 E61 E62 F42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1999-07, Revised 2000-09
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (11)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:30

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