Optimal Ownership Regime in the Presence of Investment Spillovers

Valeria Gattai and Piergiovanna Natale

No 332, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: In the context of the property rights theory of the firm, we study the role of investment spillovers in shaping the efficiency ranking of ownership regimes. In our model, spillovers arise from asset-embodied investment and footloose investment. Under the former, the benefits of investment can be appropriated only through asset control; under the latter, the benefits of investment can be appropriated independently of asset control. Our model predicts that asset-embodied investment favors the adoption of non-integration, while joint ownership may prevail in the presence of footloose investment.

Keywords: Incomplete contracts; Property rights; Investment spillovers; Joint-control (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D23 D86 L24 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 21
Date: 2016-03-29, Revised 2016-03-29
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cta
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations:

Downloads: (external link)
http://repec.dems.unimib.it/repec/pdf/mibwpaper332.pdf (application/pdf)

Related works:
This item may be available elsewhere in EconPapers: Search for items with the same title.

Export reference: BibTeX RIS (EndNote, ProCite, RefMan) HTML/Text

Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:332

Access Statistics for this paper

More papers in Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics Contact information at EDIRC.
Bibliographic data for series maintained by Matteo Pelagatti ().