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An investigation of weak-veto rules in preference aggregation

Stergios Athanasoglou

No 363, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: A new class of preference-aggregation rules is proposed, weak-veto rules. Weak-veto rules are applicable in settings characterized by strong pre-existing views on the desirability of different outcomes, whose recommendations should be modified only in the presence of strenuous opposition. They are characterized by strategy-proofness, strong efficiency, and unanimity-basedness. When non-manipulability requirements are strengthened to K-strategy-proofness, the positive results are weakened, except for the case of three alternatives and a sub-class of weak-veto rules based on Kemeny distances. This demonstrates the compatibility of stronger efficiency and non-manipulability properties for the three-alternative model.

Keywords: social choice; preference aggregation; strategy-proofness; weak-veto rules (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 C70 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2017-02-18, Revised 2017-02-18
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