Procurement in Big Science Centres: politics or technology? Evidence from CERN

Andrea Bastianin and Chiara Del Bo

No 410, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: Procurement from Big Science Centers (BSC) yields a variety of spillover effects that can ultimately have growth enhancing consequences for their partner countries. We study the determinants of procurement for the biggest research infrastructure ever built: the Large Hadron Collider (LHC) at CERN. Using a unique cross-section database of firms that have registered to become industrial partners of the LHC program, we estimate the determinants for potential suppliers of receiving an order from CERN. We compare the relative weight of firms’ technological features and CERN’s procurement rules aimed at securing a juste retour for its Member States. Our results point to a strong impact of technological factors, while also highlighting the importance of political constraints related with CERN’s procurement rules as well as the presence of a home bias. Since the constraints related with the achievement of a juste retour affect–directly or indirectly–the procurement policy of many European BSCs, our results have policy implications that go beyond the CERN case study.

Keywords: big science; procurement; innovation; hi-tech; CERN. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C21 C25 H57 O32 O38 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 37
Date: 2019-05-21, Revised 2019-05-21
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-ino and nep-tid
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:410

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