Group size as selection device

Francesco De Sinopoli, Leo Ferraris and Claudia Meroni

No 533, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: In a coordination game with multiple Pareto ordered equilibria and population uncertainty, we show that group size helps select a unique equilibrium, for reasons reminiscent of the global games literature. A critical mass phenomenon emerges at equilibrium. Group size has an emboldening effect on participants.

Keywords: Poisson Games; Coordination Games; Equilibrium Selection; Global Games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 28
Date: 2024-03
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-gth and nep-mic
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