Economics of Science

Lorenzo Rocco

No 55, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: In this paper we argue that the incentive scheme faced by scientists induces them to promote their activity, publishing on-line their work-in-progress, participating or organising meetings and so on. Such actions produce a huge amount of externalities that may make easier for others to deal with the same topics. Recognizing this influence, we present four game theoretic settings which aim to replicate same features of the research world, such as the "fashions" or the separation between "common researchers" and "stars".

Pages: 36 pages
Date: 2002-08, Revised 2002-08
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)

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