Votes for Work? Job Patronage and Electoral Mobilization in Albania

Luca J. Uberti, Drini Imami and Mariapia Mendola

No 561, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: We examine the impact of an election campaign on the labor market outcomes of incumbent party supporters. Using unique data on voters' political preferences during a critical pre-election period in Albania, our difference-in-differences estimates show that supporting the ruling party prior to elections significantly improves individuals' employment and earnings. This labor market premium is particularly pronounced among individuals with low costs of campaign participation, whereas patronage jobs are concentrated in lower-tier public sector positions. Administrative data further show that job distribution to party supporters strongly correlates with increased vote shares for the incumbent. Our findings suggest that parties strategically allocate public employment to mobilize grassroots supporters and secure votes—a practice that fosters corruption and weakens democratic institutions.

Keywords: Job patronage; political corruption; vote-buying; Albania; post-communist transition. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D73 H83 J45 M59 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 71
Date: 2025-11
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:561

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