Optimal use of scarce information: When partisan voters are socially useful

Paolo Balduzzi ()
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Paolo Balduzzi: Department of Economics, University of Milan-Bicocca

No 87, Working Papers from University of Milano-Bicocca, Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a model of simultaneous and sequential voting in a committee where members do not share their private information and do not have the same preferences. When objective functions differ, an optimal order in the sequential game can be found, leading to a unique socially optimal equilibrium. Our result rationalizes the presence of biased (i.e., partisan) voters in small committees as a way of reaching social optimality.

Keywords: voting behaviour; private information; sequential games (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D71 D72 D82 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 35 pages
Date: 2005-03, Revised 2005-03
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mib:wpaper:87

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