Explaining the Role of Interest Groups in United States Trade Policy

Alan Deardorff and R. Hall

Working Papers from Research Seminar in International Economics, University of Michigan

Abstract: This paper provides an alternative analytical view of the mechanism by which interest groups influence trade policy. In contrast to other economic models in which trade policy is essentially "bought" by industrial interests, this model views interest groups and legislators as possibly sharing the same objectives, which they then work together to pursue. The legislators have a limited budget of their own and their staff members' time to work on many issues, and the interest groups influence the process by helping with the work. By selecting legislators who are in closest agreement with their own objectives and then by assisting them in a way that, in effect, subsidizes their efforts, interest groups achieve a role in policy making that is potentially more important than if they merely used financial transfers.

Keywords: TRADE POLICY; INTEREST GROUPS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: F13 H10 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 25 pages
Date: 1997
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (2)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mie:wpaper:415

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