Liberalization-privatization paths: policies and politics

Filippo Belloc () and Antonio Nicita ()

Departmental Working Papers from Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano

Abstract: We empirically investigate the political determinants of deregulation policies in six network industries of thirty OECD countries, over 1975-2007. Contrary to previous literature, we unbundle privatization and liberalization policies and measure whether their simultaneous determination is affected by government’s ideology. Despite conventional wisdom, we find a systematic political trade-off between privatizations and liberalizations. Right-wing executives tend to privatize more and to liberalize less, relative to left-wing governments. The main lesson we derive is that ideological cleavages affect the composition of deregulation policy. Our results may shed new lights on the political-economic rationale behind deregulation choices.

Keywords: Liberalization; Privatization; Network Industries; Partisanship (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C23 D72 L50 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2011-11-30
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Related works:
Working Paper: Liberalization-Privatization Paths: Policies and Politics (2011)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2011-32

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