The Effect of Group Identity on Distributive Choice: Social Preference or Heuristic?

Francesco Guala () and Antonio Filippin

Departmental Working Papers from Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano

Abstract: Group identity can influence significantly people’s attitudes toward monetary allocations. In this paper we reassess the representation of group identity using social preference models. First, we show that the influence of group identity varies unsystematically across different types of mini-dictator’s games and cannot be described using a well-behaved preference function. Second, we demonstrate that the effect is not robust to slightly increasing the complexity of the task, suggesting that group identity is a framing effect that can be easily displaced by alternative decision heuristics.

Keywords: Identity; groups; dictator’s game; social preferences (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C91 D03 D30 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2013-11-18
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Related works:
Journal Article: The Effect of Group Identity on Distributive Choice: Social Preference or Heuristic? (2017)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2013-19

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