Preferences: Neither Behavioural nor Mental
Francesco Guala ()
Departmental Working Papers from Department of Economics, Management and Quantitative Methods at Università degli Studi di Milano
Recent debates on the nature of preferences in economics have typically assumed that they are to be interpreted either as behavioural regularities or as mental states. In this paper I challenge this dichotomy and argue that neither interpretation is consistent with scientific practice in choice theory and behavioural economics. Preferences are dispositions with a multiply realizable causal basis, which explains why economists are reluctant to make a commitment about their interpretation.
Keywords: Preferences; Utility; Behavioural economics; Behaviourism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: B41 D01 D03 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mil:wpdepa:2017-05
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