Determinants of the Informativeness of Analyst Research

S.P. Kothari, Joseph Weber and Richard M. Frankel

No 4243-02, Working papers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management

Abstract: Analyst research helps prices reflect information about a security's fundamentals. However, analysts' private incentives potentially contribute to misleading research and it is possible that the market fixates on such misleading and/or optimistic reports. We examine cross-sectional determinants of the informativeness of analyst reports, i.e., their effect on security prices, controlling for endogeneity among the factors affecting informativeness. Analysts are more informative when the potential brokerage profits are higher (e.g., high trading volume and high volatility) and when they reveal "bad news." Analyst informativeness is reduced in circumstances of increased information processing costs. We fail to find evidence that informativeness of analyst reports is due to market's fixation or over- or under-reaction to analyst reports.

Keywords: Forecast; Analyst; Market Effieiency; Informativeness; Earnings Forecast; Analyst Forcast (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2002-06-07
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (3)

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