The Macroeconomics of Specificity

Ricardo Caballero () and M-L Hammour

Working papers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics

Abstract: Specific quasi-rents build up in a wide variety of economic relationships, and are exposed to opportunism unless fully protected by contract. The recognition that such contracts are often incomplete has yielded major insights into the organization of microeconomic exchange. Rent appropriation, we argue, also has important macroeconomic implications.

Keywords: RENT; CONTRACTS (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: J41 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 46 pages
Date: 1996
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Working Paper: The Macroeconomics of Specificity (1996)
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