Good Jobs Versus Bad Jobs: Theory and Some Evidence
Daron Acemoglu
Working papers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics
Abstract:
This paper offers a model of the interaction between composition of jobs and labor market regulation. Ex post rent-sharing due to search frictions implies that "good" jobs which have higher creation costs must pay higher wages. This wage differential distorts the composition of jobs, and in the unregulated equilibrium there are too many bad jobs relative to the number of good jobs.
Keywords: HUMAN CAPITAL; JOB SEEKERS; UNEMPLOYMENT; INSURANCE; WAGE DETERMINATION (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D83 J24 J31 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 50 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (5)
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Working Paper: Good Jobs versus Bad Jobs: Theory and Some Evidence (1997) 
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MASSACHUSETTS INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (MIT), DEPARTMENT OF ECONOMICS, 50 MEMORIAL DRIVE CAMBRIDGE MASSACHUSETTS 02142 USA
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