Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence

Daron Acemoglu and J.S. Pischki
Authors registered in the RePEc Author Service: Jorn-Steffen Pischke

Working papers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics

Abstract: This paper offers and tests a theory of training whereby workers do not pay for general training they receive.

Keywords: TRAINING; EDUCATION; THEORY; INFORMATION; LABOUR MARKET (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D82 J20 J24 J40 J42 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 41 pages
Date: 1996
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (36)

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Related works:
Journal Article: Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence (1998)
Working Paper: Why do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence (1996)
Working Paper: Why Do Firms Train? Theory and Evidence (1996)
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