A Theory of Political Transitions

Daron Acemoglu and James Robinson

No 99-26, Working papers from Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics

Abstract: We develop a theory of political transitions inspired in part by the experiences of Western Europe and Latin America. Nondemocratic societies are controlled by a rich elite. The initially disenfranchised poor can contest power by threatening social unrest or revolution, and this may force the elite to democratize. Democracy may not consolidate because it is more redistributive than a nondemocratic regime, and this gives the elite an incentive to mount a coup. Because inequality makes democracy more costly to the elite, highly unequal cocieties are less likely to consolidate democracy and may end up oscillating between regimes or in a nondemocratic repressive regime. An unequal society is likely to experience fiscal volatility, but the relationship between inequality and redistribution is nonmonotonic; societies with intermediate levels of unequality consolidate democracy and redistribute more than both very equal and very unequal countries. We also show that asset redistribution, such as educational and land reform, may be used to consolidate both democratic and nondemocratic regimes

Keywords: democracy; dictatorship; inequality; political instability; redistribution (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: D72 D74 O15 P16 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 32 pages
Date: 1999-11
New Economics Papers: this item is included in nep-cdm, nep-dev, nep-his, nep-mic and nep-pub
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (27)

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Journal Article: A Theory of Political Transitions (2001)
Working Paper: A Theory of Political Transitions (1999)
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