Fiscal Policy, Business Cycles and Labor-Market Fluctuations

Florin Bilbiie and Roland Straub ()
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Roland Straub: European University Institute, Visiting researcher at the MNB, summer 2003.

No 2004/6, MNB Working Papers from Magyar Nemzeti Bank (Central Bank of Hungary)

Abstract: In this paper we study the effects and transmission of fiscal policy in a dynamic general equilibrium sticky-price model with non-Ricardian agents, distortionary taxation and a Walrasian labor market. We derive a simple analytical framework for fiscal policy similar to the workhorse 'new synthesis' model widely used in the monetary policy literature. We then explore theoretical conditions under which government spending (whether financed by lump-sum or income taxes) can increase private consumption as observed in the data. We conclude that making the model fare better in this respect necessarily makes it fare worse in what concerns real wage fluctuations. Additionally, we show that the model can generate non-Keynesian effects of fiscal policy when participation to asset markets is limited enough and the monetary policy rule is passive.

Keywords: Fiscal Policy; Dynamic General Equilibrium; Distortionary Taxation; Sticky Prices; Non-Ricardian Agents; Government Debt; Non-Keynesian Effects. (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: E32 E62 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Pages: 54 pages
Date: 2004
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Citations: View citations in EconPapers (37)

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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnb:wpaper:2004/6

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