Strategic Voting in Multiparty Systems: A Group Experiment

Michael F. Meffert and Thomas Gschwend ()

No 08-10, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: The paper tests the theory of strategic voting for multiparty systems with proportional representation and coalition governments at the micro-level. The study focuses in particular on the question whether participation in repeated elections allows voters to learn from experience and enables them to optimize their decision behavior. An economic group experiment with decision scenarios of varying degrees of difficulty was used to test decision making at both the individual and group level. The results suggest that a majority of voters were able to pursue successful decision strategies and that the difficulty of the decision scenarios affected the voting performance of the participants as expected. However, a learning effect is not supported by the data.

Date: 2008
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