Are the Treasures of Game Theory Ambiguous?

Jürgen Eichberger and David Kelsey

No 08-08, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: Goeree & Holt (2001) observe that, for some parameter values, Nash equilibrium provides good predictions for actual behaviour in experiments. For other payoff parameters, however, actual behaviour deviates consistently from that predicted by Nash equilibria. They attribute the robust deviations from Nash equilibrium to actual players’ considering not only marginal gains and losses but also total pay-offs. In this paper, we show that optimistic and pessimistic attitudes towards strategic ambiguity may induce such behaviour.

Keywords: Ambiguity; coordination games; experiments; traveller’s dilemma; matching pennies; optimism (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: C72 D81 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2008
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Journal Article: Are the treasures of game theory ambiguous? (2011)
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