Banks without parachutes: competitive effects of government bail-out policies

Hendrik Hakenes and Isabel Schnabel

No 04-53, Papers from Sonderforschungsbreich 504

Abstract: The explicit or implicit protection of banks through government bail-out policies is a universal phenomenon. We analyze the competitive effects of such policies in two models with different degrees of transparency in the banking sector. Our main result is that the bail-out policy unambiguously leads to higher risk-taking at those banks that do not enjoy a bail-out guarantee. The reason is that the prospect of a bail-out induces the protected bank to expand, thereby intensifying competition in the deposit market and depressing other banks' margins. In contrast, the effects on the protected bank's risk-taking and on welfare depend on the transparency of the banking sector.

Keywords: Government bail-out; banking competition; transparency; “too big to fail”; financial stability (search for similar items in EconPapers)
JEL-codes: G21 G28 L11 (search for similar items in EconPapers)
Date: 2004
References: View references in EconPapers View complete reference list from CitEc
Citations: View citations in EconPapers (6)

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https://madoc.bib.uni-mannheim.de/2690/1/dp04_53.pdf

Related works:
Journal Article: Banks without parachutes: Competitive effects of government bail-out policies (2010)
Working Paper: Banks without Parachutes – Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies (2004)
Working Paper: Banks without Parachutes - Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies (2004)
Working Paper: Banks without Parachutes -- Competitive Effects of Government Bail-out Policies (2004)
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Persistent link: https://EconPapers.repec.org/RePEc:mnh:spaper:2690

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